The chestnut forest concessions of the Peruvian Amazon: a success or a failure?
Abstract
In the Department of Madre de Dios, Peru, the performance of concessions for chestnut extraction, established in 2000, has been contrasting both inside (Tambopata National Reserve) and outside protected areas. Based on a set of governance indicators, this paper suggests that chestnut concessions within the Reserve perform better than those outside it. Outside of protected areas, where the vast majority of concessions are concentrated, there is a paradoxical situation of excessive regulation, but with minimal intervention by state agencies; ineffective monitoring and sanctions; and poor compliance with the law with excessively high punitive measures and power imbalances in the value chain. Further, it is concluded that the long-term sustainability of the chestnut concession system could be compromised. A new vision requires formal recognition of the variety of land uses (particularly outside protected areas), the implementation and validation of multipurpose silvicultural approaches, a management that is more in line with local aspirations and the establishment of effective negotiation platforms with different productive sectors and government agencies.